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Summary 
Farms are increasingly being affected by policies that involve production rights. Because 
fluctuation in prices of these rights in the cash market, farmers face a price risk. A futures 
market would enable them to hedge against this price risk. Rights futures have some features 
that differ from those of traditional commodity futures, which make them very suitable for 
futures trading. One such a feature of rights futures contracts is that, unlike traditional 
commodity futures, rights futures have no residual risk at maturity. The underlying 
commodity is identical to the commodity in the cash market, which is seldom the case with 
traditional commodities. Nor is the place of delivery of importance because delivery takes 
place by book entry and hence will not adversely affect the hedging effectiveness. In this 
article it is shown that, because of this nature of rights, relatively more will be hedged than in 
the case of traditional commodities. We argue that a futures market of rights can be an 
effective and efficient tool for managing price risk, and will illustrate this for milk quota. To 
provide insight into its viability, some indication is given what might happen if such a futures 
market was established in the Netherlands, England and Wales. 
1 Introduction 
Between 1973 and 1983, milk production in the European Union (EU) rose by 30% while 
consumption only rose by 9% (Braatz, 1992). This resulted in very large stocks of butter and 
milk powder, which put a strong pressure on the EU-budget due to the Common Agricultural 
Policy guaranteed price system. As a result a milk quota scheme was put into practice on 
April 2 1984. All EU-members had the right to produce a certain quantity of milk. Within a 
large framework, states were free to implement the policy at their own discretion. The EU has 
allowed the transfer of quotas within country borders. National governments must add their 
own rules to the framework of EU-regulations. Despite the fact that these EU-regulations 
require milk quota to be linked to land when buying or selling milk quota, in the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom there are ways to circumvent this requirement. In 1987 member 
states were given the option to introduce quota leasing as a possibility of transferring quotas. 
The trade in milk quota is increasing every year, most of which occurs in the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands. The underlying value of this trade in these two countries exceeded one 
billion US dollars in the milk year 1993/94 (Van Dijk and Pennings, 1995). For that reason 
our attention has been focused on England, Wales and the Netherlands. 
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2 Cash market of milk rights: need for hedging 
In the EU most cash markets of milk rights have not been structured or developed well. 
Canada, on the other hand, developed a centralized spot market in the 1980s. There have been 
centralized spot markets of milk rights in Ontario since 1980 and in Quebec since 1985. In the 
EU such centralized spot markets have not been established yet. 
England and Wales 
As can been seen from Figure 1 total quantities transferred have grown continuously in 
England and Wales, and so has the quantity being put to lease. 
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Figure 1. Milk quota being transferred in England and Wales 
Source: National Deary Council, 1995 
The prices of milk quota have reached higher levels each year during the first five years of the 
scheme. Prices have fluctuated considerably, mainly at the end of the year. 
The Netherlands 
The development of the milk quota market in the Netherlands was given an additional boost 
by the introduction of leasing in 1989/90. Leasing is still gaining popularity. In 1988/89 about 
300,000 tonnes of quota were transferred permanently among farms. The next year, after 
leasing had been introduced, total quantity transferred remained roughly the same; however, 
only 180,000 tonnes were transferred permanently, the rest was put to lease, indicating a shift 
towards temporary transfers. Figure 2 shows a rapid growth in leasing and a much slower 
growth in permanent transfers in succeeding years. In the quota year 1994/1995 18,078 lease 
contracts were concluded, an increase of 47% compared with the year before. Contracts for 
permanent transfers were 6,243 in number, an increase of 6% compared with the year before. 
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Figure 2. Milk quota being transferred in the Netherlands 
Source: Product Board for Dairy Products, 1995 
The distributions of milk quota prices in the milk price year 1993/94 for both buy/sell and 
lease are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The farmers are classified by the level of the milk quota 
price into five almost equal (in amount) dairy farm groups. 
Table 1. Distribution of milk quota purchases/sales prices in Dutch Guilders in 1993/94 
Number of dairy Price per kilogram Minimum price Maximum price 
farms in class % of milk quota in class in class 
20.2 
17.8 
21.9 
20.5 
19.6 
2.81 
4.06 
4.22 
4.38 
4.85 
0.56 
4.00 
4.16 
4.32 
4.49 
3.99 
4.15 
4.31 
4.45 
5.84 
100.0 3.96 0.56 5.84 
Source: LEl-accounting, 1995 
The data in Tables 1 and 2 have been obtained from a sample of 500 dairy farms. The 
price differences, in both buy/sell and lease, among the different classes are great, because in 
the Netherlands the spot market for milk quota is not transparent. 
Risks 
In the Netherlands and the United Kingdom most transactions are conducted with the help of 
intermediaries. Official brokers normally charge fixed mark up commission, so the largest 
share of the price risk is borne by the farmers. Traders in milk quota do take price risk and 
make cash forward contracts with farmers. 
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Table 2. Distribution of milk quota lease prices in Dutch Guilders in 1993/94 
Number of dairy 
farms in class % 
20.5 
17.9 
22.6 
18.9 
20.1 
100.0 
Price per kilogram 
of milk quota 
0.3250 
0.3808 
0.4028 
0.4299 
0.4681 
0.4013 
Minimum price 
in class 
0.2074 
0.3576 
0.4000 
0.4101 
0.4421 
0.2074 
Maximum price 
in class 
0.3538 
0.3999 
0.4100 
0.4401 
0.6170 
0.6170 
Source: LEl-accounting, 1995 
For both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands we have observed an increased trade in 
milk quota and considerable price differentials among regions and periods of time. This 
presents management problems for farmers. First, if the farmer intends to sell or buy milk 
quota, (s)he does not know the price at the end of the milk price year, so faces a price risk. 
Second, dairy farmers who sell milk quota at the end of the milk price year have to sell their 
dairy cows within a very short period, theoretically, within an infinitely short period of time, 
because after selling the milk quota they are no longer allowed to produce milk any longer for 
the next milk price year. Because of the farmers having to sell all dairy cows at once, they are 
not able to receive the best price for the herd. For the same reasons, problems will exist for 
farmers who want to expand their farms. Milk quota futures will provide an efficient tool for 
managing this price risk. 
Futures markets provide participants with opportunities for hedging, and make the market 
transparent. On average, only 3% of the trade that is conducted is actually delivered (Catania, 
1989). In the case of a futures market in rights, the actual delivery will be greater at the 
beginning of such a market, because the cash markets of most rights are not sufficiently liquid 
yet. Hedgers who fail to make a deal on the cash market will not offset their futures market 
position. As will be demonstrated in the next section, this higher frequency of delivery will 
not pose a problem in the case of a futures market in rights, because of their characteristics. 
3 Optimal hedging ratio and hedging effectiveness 
Futures contracts are standardized with respect to time of delivery, delivery location, quality 
and unit of trading (Sandor, 1973). This standardization process is very complicated for 
commodities, especially with respect to location of delivery and commodity characteristics 
(such as sort and form), causing basis risk. A right, however, is a perfect homogeneous 
'commodity', i.e., the underlying commodity of a rights futures contract is identical to the 
commodity in the cash market, implying that there are no problems with respect to delivery, 
because delivery takes place by transferring book entries between accounts (Pirrong et al., 
1994). Nor are there any problems with respect to quality. 
Consider a farmer who can lock in the price risks regarding milk rights with the help of 
milk rights futures. We assume that the only production costs are the costs of acquiring milk 
rights, which will not affect our conclusions. Given that the farmer wishes to maximize the 
expected revenue in the next time period adjusted for risk, where risk is measured by the 
variance of the expected revenue, the objective function can be based on the expected value-
4 
A futures market of agricultural production rights 167 
variance (EV) model (Peck, 1975; Kahl, 1983; Barry and Robison, 1987). The EV approach 
is justified because we use this model for determining the relationship between the variables 
and for showing the direction of change in relevant variables if changes occur in other factors 
that comprise the decision environment. We do not use the EV model for its measurability.1 
The objective function can be expressed as: 
T1« = E(T1)-AVAR(T1) (1) 
where n« is the certainty equivalent, E(Yl) is the expected revenue and VAR(Yl) represents 
the variance of the revenue. A denotes the risk parameter which, for risk-averse decision 
makers, is positive, thus providing compensation for risk bearing (Pratt, 1954). At time t the 
farmer wishes to maximize the certainty equivalent for the next period f+1. Given that the 
cash positions are predetermined, the expected processing margin at time r+1 equals the 
revenue from selling the main product minus the cost of buying the milk rights in the cash and 
futures markets, corrected for the transaction costs and the basis, where the basis is defined as 
the local cash price minus futures price. The expected revenue can now be written as: 
£(n) = pß - [a(f, - /,+l) + /?(ƒ,,, + z,,t|)+|a| TC] (2) 
where p,+l is the price of milk, a the amount of milk quota being hedged, ß the total 
amount of milk quota needed, which equals the total amount of milk produced, ƒ, the futures 
price at which the contract is opened, ƒ,+, the expected settlement futures price, bl+l is the 
expected basis at maturity and TC the transaction costs. 
Let <T (^tl. o?/+, and o»/H be the variance of the milk price, the variance of the settlement 
futures price and the variance of the basis, respectively. The variance of the revenue is now 
given by: 
VAR(n) = (a.ß)2a}i,+ß2al^ß2alr2ß(a-ß)a/,,lh,.^2ß(a-ß)a/,.,P-2ß2(Tp,^, 
(3) 
where p,+1, ƒ+, and bl+l have a constant variance conditional on the information available at 
time / given by: 
o>,„ = £(ƒ>,„-f'CA.i))2 
<T/,., = £ (ƒ , • , - £ , ( ƒ , . , ) )2 
oi., = E(b,*\- £/(6,+i))2 
The optimal hedging amount can be derived by taking the first derivatives from n c e with 
respect to a . Hence, the optimal hedging amount can be expressed as: 
1
 For the conditions that justify the use of the EV model and the discussion on the use of the EV model and the 
general expected utility model the reader is referred to Bigelow (1993), Pulley (1981), Tew et al. (1991) and 
Robison and Hanson (1997) (this volume). 
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a^^r^^ß-^-ßP^ (4) 
where p is the correlation coefficient between the basis and the futures price at maturity. 
Castelino (1992) showed that usually this correlation is negative. As a result equation (4) 
implies that, if the variance in the basis increases, less will be hedged. Because of the 
characteristics of rights, as explained in the beginning of this section, the variance of the basis 
will be small. So, normally more will be hedged in the case of rights than in the case of 
hedging traditional commodities, since the latter introduces basis risk. 
Not only by the optimal hedging ratio, but also by the minimum-variance hedge ratio are 
we able to show that more rights will be hedged than traditional commodities (Ederington, 
1979; Paroush and Wolf, 1989). Theoretically, if basis risk is zero, the minimum-variance 
hedge ratio is unity and residual risk is zero (Castelino, 1992). 
In looking for viability of such a futures market, it is not only interesting that rights 
themselves can be hedged effectively, but also that rights futures lend themselves to cross 
hedging the revenue capacity of the farm. In theory, farmers affected by rights will purchase 
or sell rights, depending on their initial cost structure, up to the net benefit (Varian, 1990). 
The total rights allocated by the government are fixed. So: . 
Q=<t>Ri and T.R,=-R0 
i- i 
where ß, are the units of output used by firm i, /?, are the units of rights used by firm i, N is 
the total number of firms and RQ is the total number of rights allocated by the government. 
For reasons of simplicity, assume that the firm needs one right in order to produce one unit of 
output2, i.e., <j> = 1. Assume further that the only entry barrier to the industry is the fact that 
rights are needed in order to produce, i.e., the only limiting factor is the rights. The fact that 
the only limiting factor is the rights implies that the price of rights can be seen as an economic 
rent. The economic rent generated in the production process is allocated to the rights. Even 
with a fixed number of rights allocated, it will always be possible to enter the industry by 
buying rights. The competition for rights among potential entrants will force up the prices of 
the rights to the point at which the net benefit of producing equals the price of rights (Varian, 
1990). 
The value of the rights at industry level can be expressed as: 
PRRO = PR0-C(R0) (5) 
where PR is the price of rights and C(ÄQ) is the cost of production excluding the cost of buying 
the rights. The cost concept used in equation (5) is broad, i.e., these costs include the reward 
for the factors of production (of land, labour and capital (including capital reserves), as well 
as other costs). 
Equation (5) shows that the price of rights reflects the possibilities of marketing the output 
(i.e., the output price) and the cost structure of the production process (excluding the cost of 
rights). Hence, the price of rights is a proxy for the performance of the industry. If the 
Relaxing this assumption will not change the conclusions of the analysis. 
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industry's performance is good, then buyers are willing to pay a high price for the right, and 
vice versa. So, futures rights are not only an efficient tool for hedging against adverse price 
fluctuations of rights, but also for hedging against adverse fluctuations in the revenue capacity 
of the production process (Anderson and Danthine, 1981; Black, 1986; Ames and Myneni, 
1992). 
4 Viability of a futures market of milk rights 
From the list of criteria other authors have considered necessary for selecting commodities for 
futures trading (Carlton, 1984; Black, 1986; Brorsen and Fofana, 1995), the following 
characteristics can be selected for success or failure of futures contracts. 
1. One's own hedge should bear less risk than the existing cross hedge contract. 
2. Volatility of price of the commodity in cash market. 
3. The liquidity cost of using one's own futures markets should be lower than that of using 
the existing cross-hedge futures markets. 
4. The cash market must be large. 
5. The marketing channel must not be vertically integrated nor highly concentrated. 
6. The cash market must be active. 
7. The commodity traded must be homogeneous. 
These criteria are all satisfied for milk rights, but because of space limitations, they are not 
elaborated upon. 
We propose two kinds of contract specifications. Futures (1) is defined as the right to 
produce an amount of milk each milk year as long as the EU milk policy is maintained. 
Futures (2) is defined as the right to produce an amount of milk for a particular milk price 
year. The first contract is connected with the milk quota buy/sell market, the latter with the 
lease market. Farmers who intend to quit dairy production or want to expand their milk quota 
in the long run can use contract 1. Contract 2 is suited for short-term quota sales or 
acquisitions. 
The following assumptions apply: 
1. A futures contract represents 7000 kilograms of milk quota (this amount equals the average 
yearly production of a dairy cow) with a specific fat percentage; 
2. The dairy farmer uses the minimum variance hedge which, in the case of milk rights, 
means that (s)he hedges 100% of his/her spot market transactions; and 
3. The turnover of the futures contract is, because of a lack of empirical insight into the cash 
market and futures market of milk rights, cautiously set at one, i.e., hedgers trade only 
with hedgers on the futures market. 
In order to calculate the volume generated by hedgers, the size of the cash market is 
divided by that of the futures contract. 
The amount of milk quota that is bought and sold in the spot market is not expected to 
increase. This in contradistinction to leasing of milk quota. The reason is that dairy farmers 
who sell their quota will, in general, go out of business. Farmers who continue to be in 
business will use futures contract 2, because of the high fixed cost involved in buying milk 
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quota. The group of dairy farmers with the smallest production scale, i.e., potential sellers of 
quota, is decreasing. This phenomenon will have an impact on the future of futures contract 
1. This group of farmers will use the futures market to manage their price risk, which consists 
of two components: the price of their herds and of the milk quota. The volume in hypothetical 
futures market 1 is therefore expected to decline steadily. 
We are aware of the fact that the procedure followed is a simple one and omits some 
important variables. Research is being conducted, built upon work of Black (1986) and 
Brorsen and Fofana (1995), which includes variables, such as spot price variance, vertical 
integration and so on. 
The estimates in Table 3 show that the idea of establishing a futures market of milk quota 
in the Netherlands and England and Wales would be an interesting one, if compared with the 
existing European agricultural futures markets. Note that the estimates in Table 3 are the 
volume generated by hedgers; we did not incorporate the volume generated by scalpers and 
speculators. Further research is being conducted. It includes the volume generated by 
speculators and a model with variables, such as cash price variance, vertical integration and 
so on, in order to estimate futures contract volume. 
Table 3. Volume of contracts generated by hedgers on the (hypothetical) futures markets in 
the Netherlands (NL) and England and Wales (E&W) 
Year Hypothetical futures contract 1 Hypothetical futures contract 2 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
NL 
25,714 
27,857 
30,857 
28,571 
28,571 
E&W 
59,680 
101,966 
133,367 
149,097 
180,543 
NL 
18,000 
30,142 
42,714 
57,149 
67,143 
E&W 
68,871 
88,695 
101,598 
103,866 
130,543 
Source: our own calculations, 1995 
The volumes calculated strongly depend on the assumption that farmers hedge all of their 
cash position, which is an optimistic assumption. They also depend on whether turnover of 
the futures market is one, i.e., that hedgers trade with hedgers, which is a pessimistic 
assumption. Therefore, we calculated the volumes for 1994 for different levels of turnover 
and hedging ratios, as shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
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